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Stephanie Ben-Ishai Dual Class Shares in Canada:
Poonam Puri* An Historical Analysis
Dual class shares have been used by Canadian corporations to access public
capital markets for the past sixty years. The debates surrounding the regulation
of dual class shares have been reenergized. The authors of this article argue
that only by looking to the legitimating role of nationalist policy, legislation and
discourse in the historical development of dual class share structures can we
derive context to the current debates surrounding the regulation of dual class
shares and obtain a fuller understanding of the contemporary issues they present.
Based on an analysis of the use of dual class shares as a financing technique over
the past six decades, the central claim made in this article is that the legitimating
function of nationalist policies, legislation and discourse provides the most
compelling explanation for the persistence of dual class shares in Canada. The
authors argue that reliance on policy, legislation and discourse that addressed
concerns regarding foreign ownership and domination of Canadian business best
accounts for the proliferation of dual class share structures in the 1970s, and their
continued use in the current context. Their analysis also explores various themes
that have operated alongside or in opposition to nationalist policies, legislation
and discourse: the concentration of ownership of Canadian business, the roles
of multiple regulators in securities and corporate law, convergence between
shareholders and other stakeholders, and rising shareholder activism.
Depuis quelque soixante ans, les soci6tds canadiennes utilisent la possibilit6
d'6mettre des actions de deux cat6gories pour avoir acces aux marches
financiers. Le d6bat qui entoure la r6glementation des deux categories d'actions
a repris de la vigueur. Les auteurs de Particle avancent que ce n'est qu'en
tentant de lgitimer le r6le des politiques, des lois et du discours nationalistes
dans le dveloppement historique des structures j deux categories d'actions
qu'il est possible de comprendre le contexte des d~bats actuels entourant
la r6glementation des actions de deux categories et de bien comprendre les
problemes qu'ils soulevent. Fond6 sur une analyse de Iutilisation, au cours des
six dernieres d~cennies, de deux categories d'actions comme technique de
financement, Iargument essentiel avanc6 dans cet article est que la fonction de
l6gitimation des politiques, des lois et du discours nationalistes sont rexplication la
plus convaincante de la pdrennit6, au Canada, de Iexistence de deux cat6gories
d'actions. Les auteurs alleguent que la confiance dans les politiques, dans les
lois et dans les d~bats qui traitaient des considerations relatives 6 la propriet8
et a la domination 6trangeres des entreprises canadiennes est la meilleure
explication pour la prolif6ration des structures a deux categories d'actions des
ann6es 1970, structures qui sont toujours utilis6es aujourd'hui. Leur analyse porte
en outre sur divers thames qui ont eu cours en parallele ou en opposition aux
politiques, aux lois et au discours nationalistes : la concentration de la propridt6
d'entreprises canadiennes, le r6le des multiples organismes de r6glementation
dans le domaine des valeurs mobilires et du droit des socidtes, la convergence
entre les actionnaires et d'autres parties int6ress6es et Iactivisme croissant des
actionnaires.
*Stephanie Ben-lshai, Assistant Professor and Poonam Puri, Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law
School of York University. The research for this article was funded by a Schulich School of Business
National Research Program in Financial Services and Public Policy Grant. Val Culp and Kate Zavitz
provided excellent research assistance. We are grateful to the participants in the Sloan Program for
the Study of Business in Society June 2005 Retreat on Shareholder Valuism, and in particular Larry
Mitchell, for their comments on an earlier version of this article. We are also indebted to Philip Girard
for his many helpful suggestions and comments. All errors are our own.
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Introduction
Dual class shares have been used by Canadian corporations to access public
capital markets for the past sixty years.' In such corporations, the two
central features of share ownership - finance and control - are separated.
Beginning in the 1940s, a handful of companies incorporated non-voting
shares into their financing structures, including British Columbia Packers
Ltd., Lawson & Jones Ltd., Robinson Little & Co. Ltd., Silverwood
Industries Ltd., Traders Group Ltd., and Westfair Foods Ltd.2 The 1950s
and 1960s saw an increasing number of corporations issuing non-voting
or subordinate voting shares largely as a means for majority shareholders
to retain control of the corporation while undergoing expansion through
access to public markets. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the number
of companies listing dual classes of shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange
(TSE) dramatically increased. Currently, corporations that hold dual class
share structures account for approximately twenty to twenty-five per cent
I. Dual class shares, in this paper, refer to common shares that carry different voting rights and may
include restricted voting, subordinate voting, and non-voting shares.
2. Toronto Stock Exchange, "The Toronto Stock Exchange Submission to the Ontario Securities
Commission Concerning the Regulation of Non-voting, Multiple Voting and Restricted Voting
Common Shares" (September 1981) [unpublished], Appendix D, Special Shares Listed on the Toronto
Stock Exchange [TSE Submission].
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of those listed on the TSE.3 Within an historical and legal framework,
this article addresses the backdrop in which dual class shares have gained
resilience as a Canadian corporate financing tool.
Based on our analysis of the use of dual class shares as a financing
technique over the past six decades, the central claim we make in this article
is that the legitimating function of nationalist policies, legislation, and
discourse provides the most compelling explanation for the persistence of
dual class shares in Canada. We argue that reliance on policy, legislation,
and discourse that addressed concerns regarding foreign ownership and
domination of Canadian business best accounts for the proliferation of
dual class share structures in the 1970s, and the continued use of dual class
shares in the current context. Our analysis also surfaces various themes
that have operated alongside or in opposition to nationalist policies,
legislation, and discourse: the concentration of ownership of Canadian
business, the roles of multiple regulators in securities and corporate law,
convergence between shareholders and other stakeholders, and rising
shareholder activism.
Historically, in the face of multiple regulators and a range of corporate
and securities statutes, the unifying theme of nationalism has been effective
in legitimating and limiting regulation of dual class shares even when it
was clear that they were inconsistent with core Canadian values. The core
Canadian values we refer to in this article include democratic values and
values specific to the corporate context relating to performance and profit.
The concentration of corporate ownership in Canada has limited the
ability of shareholders and other stakeholders to effectively challenge the
use of dual class shares. However, a number of instances can be observed
where shareholders and other corporate stakeholders' interests converged
and gained prominence in light of corporate governance scandals. In
these situations, corporate stakeholders have been able to overcome the
limits of a small, highly concentrated Canadian market and expose the
inconsistencies between dual class shares and core Canadian values. In the
current context, even in the face of continued reliance on nationalist policy,
legislation, and discourse, the rising activism of shareholders combined
with a number of high profile corporate governance scandals has exposed
to regulators and the media that dual class shares are inconsistent with
core Canadian values. The debates surrounding the regulation of dual
class shares have been reenergized. Only by looking to the legitimating
3. Shareholder Association for Research and Education, "Second Class Investors: The Use and
Abuse of Subordinated Shares in Canada" (April 2004), online: Shareholder Association for Research
and Education <http://www.share.ca/files/pdfs/SHARE%20Dual%20Class%20-%20finall.pdf> at 5
[Second Class Investors].
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role of nationalist policy, legislation, and discourse in the historical
development of dual class share structures can we derive context to the
current debates surrounding the regulation of dual class shares and obtain
a fuller understanding of the contemporary issues they present.
Part I of this article begins to address the question of why, despite a
dissonance with core Canadian values, dual class shares have persisted
and proliferated. This part demonstrates the legitimating function that
nationalist policy, legislation, and discourse played in the legal, policy, and
market frameworks that promoted the use of dual class shares in Canada.
Part II then addresses the function of nationalist policy, legislation, and
discourse in the responses to the use of dual class shares, including those of
regulators, stock exchanges, issuers and investors. This article concludes
by highlighting the links between the themes and responses identified in
Parts I and II and the contemporary Canadian context.
I. Dual class shares: legal, market, andpolicyframework
1. The legal framework: emergence and evolution
The use of dual class shares as a financing technique in Canada was
facilitated by corporate statutes that permitted express deviations, in articles
of incorporation or by-laws, from the common law default rule of one vote
per share. The ability of corporations to make such deviations finds its
roots in nineteenth-century legislation. Legislation during this time period
can be categorized by three different types of statutes: statutes that created
individual corporations, statutes that established terms that authorized
the creation of corporations by private individuals or public authorities,
and statutes that established terms that governed all corporations or
corporations of a special kind.4
The general incorporation act for manufacturing, mining, mechanical
or chemical enterprises, passed by the parliament of the united provinces
(of Upper and Lower Canada) in 1850, mandated that shareholders
were entitled to as many votes as they held shares.5 Among individual
statutes, the power of shareholders was not allocated uniformly among all
corporations.6 In Canada West (Ontario), prior to the 1850s, many of the
individual incorporation statutes imposed limitations on the voting power
of large shareholders: voting power decreased as the number of shares
owned increased, while sometimes a maximum number of votes for each
4. R.C.B. Risk, "The Nineteenth-Century Foundations of the Business Corporation in Ontario"
(1973) 23 U.T.L.J. 270 at 272.
5. An Act to provide for the formation of Incorporated Joint Stock companies, for Manufacturing,
Mining, Mechanical or Chemical purposes, P.C.S. 1850, c. 28, s. V.
6. Risk, supra note 4 at 289.
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shareholder was imposed.7 By the mid-1850s, this pattern of allocation
had shifted; most individual statutes provided for one vote per share. 8 The
shift from individual incorporation statutes that imposed limitations on the
voting power of large shareholders to individual incorporation statutes that
mandated one vote per share can be located in the shifting of economic
values in that period, the most pervasive of which was the facilitation and
encouragement of private initiative.9 Moving further in the direction of
encouraging private initiative and change, general corporation statutes
increasingly allowed corporations to vary the one vote per share allocation
through their by-laws or articles of incorporation. In order to facilitate
these new economic values, corporate law became increasingly more
enabling in this period. The 1864 An Act to authorize the granting of
Charters ofIncorporation to Manufacturing, Mining, and other Companies
provided for incorporation by letters patent issued under the seal of the
governor general.'0 This Act stated that in default only of other express
provisions in the by-laws of a company, at all general meetings of the
company shareholders were entitled to as many votes as they held shares."
After Confederation, the general provisions of this Act were perpetuated
in the companies acts of the federal government, and of the provinces
of Quebec, Ontario, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Nova Scotia and Prince
Edward Island.' 2
The provinces' corporation statutes of general application provided
that in default of other express provisions, shareholders were entitled to
as many votes as they held shares. The Ontario Joint Stock Companies'
Letters Patent Act of 1874, for example, deviated from the one share/one
vote rule, providing that at all general meetings of a corporation every
shareholder was entitled to as many votes as he owned shares in the
company, unless expressly provided otherwise by letters patent or by-laws
7. Risk, supra note 4 at 289. See, for example, An Act to incorporate the Imperial Fire, Marine and
Life Insurance Company, S.P.C. 1855, c. 210, s. iv, which provided for weighted voting rights.
8. Risk, supra note 4 at 289.
9. R.C.B. Risk, "The Law and Economy in Mid-Nineteenth Century Ontario: A Perspective" in
David H. Flaherty, ed., Essays in the History of Canadian Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press
for the Osgoode Society, 1981) 88 at 103.
10. P.C.S. 1864, c. 23, s. 1.
11. Ibid., s. 5(5)(c).
12. F.W. Wegenast, The Law of Canadian Companies (Toronto: Burroughs and Company, 1931) at
22. For a general background regarding the history of corporate law statutes in Canada, see F.E. Labrie
& E.E. Palmer, "The Pre-Confederation History of Corporations in Canada" in Jacob S. Ziegel, ed.,
Studies in Canadian Company Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1967) 33; Bruce Welling, Corporate Law
in Canada: The Governing Principles (Toronto: Butterworths, 1984); and Wegenast. For a perspective
from Nova Scotia, see Jonathan H. Davidson, "Industry and the Development of Company Law in
Nineteenth-Century Nova Scotia" (1995) 15:2 N.S. Hist. Rev. 88.
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of the corporation. 3 All types of dual class shares other than subordinate
(restricted) voting shares could be issued in Ontario between 1874 and
1953, although corporation records indicate that few issued non-voting
common shares during this time period. 14 In addition, legislation enacted
by the federal government between 1869 and 1935 repeatedly enabled
corporations, by making provisions in their incorporating documents, to
deviate from the one share/one vote rule.' 5
One of the first corporations to adopt a non-voting share structure
during this time period was Molson's Brewery Ltd. (Molson), which
became a public corporation in 1945 and eyed expansion after the war.
Molson implemented a dual class share structure in December 1949; the
capital stock was subdivided on the basis of one class A share and one
class B share for each common share held. Authorized capital consisted of
1,000,000 class A shares and 1,000,000 class B shares, of which 750,000
shares of each class were outstanding. The class A and B stocks shared
equally in any distribution of assets in event of liquidation.' 6 Class B shares
held voting rights, while the class A shares were "in accordance with the
then Departmental practice, non-voting unless and until no dividends were
declared or paid there-on for two successive years."' 7 The Globe and Mail
13. S.O. 1874, c. 35, s. 22. Quebec enacted The Joint Stock Companies General Clauses Act in
1868. Section 10 stated that in default of express provisions, shareholders would be entitled to as
many votes as they held shares; S.Q. 1868, c. 24, s. 10(3). Nova Scotia and Manitoba's acts contained
similar provisions: S.N.S. 1883, c. 24, s. 30; S.M. 1875, c. 28, s. xxii(3). An Ordinance respecting
Companies, an act of the Northwest Territories (which would have applied to the areas covered by
present-day Alberta and Saskatchewan), also indicated that in default of any exceptions as to voting,
every shareholder was entitled to one vote per share: O.N.W.T. 1901, c. 20 s. 121. British Columbia
adopted the English-model "memorandum and articles of association system" when it consolidated its
corporate law in 1897. Similarly, the act stated that in default of any regulations as to voting, every
member held one vote: An Act for the Incorporation and Regulation of Joint Stock Companies and
Trading Companies, S.B.C. 1897, c. 2, s. 101. An exhaustive overview of all provincial statutes is
beyond the scope of this article.
14. Jeffrey Kerbel, Main Street to Bay Street: Restricted Shares Come to Ontario (LL.M. Thesis,
Harvard Law School, 1985) [unpublished] at 24 [Kerbel, Main Street to Bay Street].
15. See, for example the Canada Joint Stock Companies Clauses Act, S.C. 1869, c. 12, s. 11(3);
Companies Act, S.C. 1935, c. 55, s. 16. Kerbel suggests that on first reading of the 1935 act, it would
seem that restricted shares could be created, but given the fact that the incorporating authorities could
refuse to issue letters patent if they did not approve of provisions in the corporation's charter, "this
apparent freedom was largely illusory." Furthermore, Kerbel remarks that the Secretary of State, when
introducing the legislation (in 1935) indicated that a by-law restricting voting rights would not be
allowed. Upon analysis of the statute, however, Kerbel concludes that it appeared that a corporation's
share structure could be manipulated so as to provide for the creation of a class of restricted shares:
"The only inconvenience would be that the controlling group would have to hold two classes of shares
and the right to vote triggered by some presumably impossible occurrence would have to be attached
to the preferred shares." Kerbel, Main Street to Bay Street, supra note 14 at 29-33.
16. "Molson Inc." (8 March 2005), online: FPinfomart.ca <http://80-www.fpinfomart.ca. ezproxy.
library.yorku.ca/>.
17. Submission of Kenneth A.F. Gates, Vice-President and General Counsel, The Molson Companies,
to the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) (31 August 1981).
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carried a short notice on January 24, 1950, announcing that the new class
A and class B shares had been approved for listing on the Montreal Stock
Exchange (MSE).' 8 The class A and class B shares were listed on the TSE
in November 1958; that year the class A and B shares were subdivided on
a two-for-one basis. The response to Molson's issue of dual class shares
was positive, 9 consistent with the response to other corporations issuing
dual class shares in that period.2"
According to a document prepared by the Ontario Securities
Commission (OSC), between 1953 and 1970, twenty-one companies
listed non-voting shares on the TSE.2  While some provinces introduced22
certain restrictions on dual class shares, the default model was in place
in both federal and provincial corporate law by this time. While public
shareholders and employees did not appear to raise concerns with dual
class shares until the 1980s, various federal and provincial committees
considered the legality of dual class shares as business corporations
statutes underwent revisions in this period.
In 1967, the Interim Report of the Ontario Select Committee on
Company Law was released (the Lawrence Report).23 The report questioned
whether a corporation should be permitted to issue common shares,
which carried no votes; none of the briefs submitted to the committee
had advocated the adoption of a voteless common share. The committee
did indicate, however, that the corporation statutes of most provinces
permitted the issuance of such shares, and there was no evidence of abuse
or impropriety in the practice. The report ultimately recommended against
the adoption of voteless common shares, reasoning that the concept of such
a share was contrary to the principles of corporate law, which envisioned
18. "List New Molson Shares" Globe and Mail (24 January 1950) 20.
19. MacNab's Portfolio, "Accepts Molson's Offer" Financial Post (15 November 1958) 19.
20. "Investors Rush for Stock In New Steinberg's Issue" Financial Post (22 November 1958) 5.
21. TSE Submission, supra note 2, Appendix D.
22. For example, Ontario's Corporations Act of 1953 appeared to be less flexible than its predecessor
statute: S.O. 1953, c. 19. Jeffrey Kerbel suggests that the intent of the Ontario statute from 1953 to
1970 appears to have been to prohibit the issuance of all restricted shares, although it was probably
relatively easy to circumvent the provision. Section 29 of the statute provided that every holder of
preference or common shares issued after April 30, 1954, was entitled to one vote at all meetings of
the corporation for every share held, although subsection 27(2) allowed preference shares to contain
conditions, restrictions, limitations or prohibitions on the right to vote: Kerbel, supra note 14 at 25.
One commentator indicated that between 1953 and 1971, non-voting shares were only permitted in
Ontario if they were preference shares. There had to be some preference to offset the loss of the vote,
although in practice the preference could be minuscule: Kerbel, supra note 14. Not all provinces'
legislation carried such restrictions on the ability to issue non-voting or subordinate voting shares:
Quebec's Companies Act, for example, permitted corporations to issue shares of more than one class,
mandating that each share of any series of the same class carry the same right to vote, or the same
conditions and limitations respecting the right to vote. R.S.Q. 1964, c. 271, s. 45(l) and 45(3).
23. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Interim Report of the Select Committee on Company Law
(Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1967) (President: Allan Lawrence).
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that equity shareholders exercise ultimate control over management,
and that the usefulness of such shares had not been proven. 24 Ontario s
Business Corporations Act of 1970, however, rejected the committee's
recommendations. The Act provided for two types of shares: common and
special.2 1 Where a corporation had more than one class of shares, one class
was required to be common shares; other classes of shares, deemed "special
shares," could have attached to them any designations, preferences, rights,
conditions, restrictions or limitations as set out in the articles.26 Section
28 of the Act mandated equality among shares of a class.27 Corporations
could issue one or more classes of special shares, provided they had one
class of common shares outstanding.
Similarly, the issue of shares carrying differential voting rights
surfaced when a new corporation statute for Canada was drafted. In 1971,
the authors of Proposals for a New Business Corporation Law for Canada
indicated that although the draft act mentioned only "shares," shares could
be of different classes with different terms and conditions attached to
them.28 At least one class of shares in every corporation was required
to hold unrestricted voting rights. In the authors' view, the prospective
shareholder should be able to decide whether he wished to purchase
shares that did not carry a right to vote: "If, knowing the circumstances,
he elects to buy such shares, there seems to be no compelling reason
why the law should prevent him from doing so."" The authors added,
however, that protection should be granted to shareholders in situations
where their rights may change: "The law should ensure, however, that
the shareholder is given a voice on any proposal that is made to change
his rights subsequently, and a chance, if he disagrees with the proposal,
to withdraw from the corporation."3 The suggestions of the authors were
followed and implemented in the 1974 Act: corporations could issue
different classes of shares, although one class of shares was required to
have full voting rights.3
24. Ibid. at 31-33.
25. S.O. 1970, c. 53, s. 26(2) and (3).
26. Ibid., s. 26(3) and s. 27(l).
27. Ibid., s. 28. Other provinces, around this time period, did not make the distinction between
common and special shares. Quebec's act, for example, allowed for the creation of shares of more
than one class, but mandated that each share of any series of the same class carry the same right to
vote: R.S.Q. 1964, c. 271, s. 45(3); R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-38, s. 48(3).
28. Robert W.V. Dickerson, John L. Howard & Leon Getz, Proposals for a New Business
Corporations Law for Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971) at 9.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Canada Business Corporations Act, S.C. 1974, c. 33, s. 24(3) and (4).
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Provincial statutes followed the course of the federal act. When
Alberta's business corporations act was revised in 1981, commentators
reiterated that ifa corporation held one class of shares, the shares should hold
equal rights to vote, receive dividends and share property upon dissolution.
They asserted, however, that corporations should have the ability to issue
different classes of shares with different rights and restrictions.32 Alberta's
revised act, passed in 1981, stated that where a corporation had only one
class of shares, the rights of the holders were deemed equal and included
the right to vote at all meetings of shareholders.33 Ontario's statute, which
was revised in 1982, carried a similar provision.34 Articles of incorporation
could provide for more than one class of shares, providing the articles
laid out the rights, privileges, restrictions, and conditions attached to such
shares.35 The Act eliminated the classification of shares into common and
special shares.
Thus, the Canadian corporate law regime at the beginning of the
twentieth century affirmed the default common law rule of one vote per
share, although allowing express deviations from the rule. By the end of
the century, the 1975 Canadian Business Corporations Act and various
provincial statutes similarly stipulated that unless the articles otherwise
provided, each share of a corporation entitled its holder at a meeting of
shareholders to one vote.
Within the securities law framework, the use of dual classes of shares
gained additional significance with the amendments to Ontario's Securities
Act in 1978. In the event of a takeover where shares were acquired at a
premium over market value, part XIX of the Act required that a follow-up
offer be made to the shareholders who held shares of the class for which
the original take-over bid was made. 36 As such, holders of non-voting or
subordinate voting shares could be left out of any premium if an offer
was only made for a corporation's voting shares. Some members of the
investment community predicted an increase in the number of stock splits
into voting and non-voting shares due to this amendment, combined with
32. Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Alberta (Edmonton: Institute of Law
Research and Reform, 1980) at 75.
33. Business Corporations Act, S.A. 1981, c. B-15, s. 134(1).
34. Ontario Business Corporations Act, S.O. 1982, c. 4, s. 22(2).
35. Ibid., s. 22(4).
36. S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 88(1) and s. 91(1). See Mary Condon, Making Disclosure: Ideas and
Interests in Ontario Securities Regulation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998) at 211-212 for
a discussion of the inclusion of this provision in the final act.
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the increasing vulnerability widely-held corporations experienced with
respect to takeovers. 37
Ontario's "follow-up" offer provision was unique: Alberta's revised
Securities Act of 1981, for example, specifically exempted agreements
with up to 15 security holders from the provisions of the act, permitting
premiums to be offered for control blocks without requiring that the
same offer be made to minority shareholders. 38 Although the rest of the
act remained similar to Ontario's statute, some analysts predicted that the
difference could translate into more business for the Alberta exchange.3 9
Similarly, Quebec's Act did not require a follow-up offer.40 The issue
raised eyebrows when T6l-Capital Ltre. was taken over by La Verendrye
Management Corp. in 1979: La Verendrye offered three times as much for
T616 Capital's voting shares as the non-voting shares (the latter of which
were held by the public), in an agreement with two of the three principal
holders of the voting shares.41
2. Dual class shares and the concentration of corporate ownership in
Canada
Within an enabling legislative framework, corporations were able to
implement dual class share structures as a means to raise equity capital.
From the 1940s to the 1960s, the main impetus for corporations to adopt
a dual class share structure was to maintain the control position of the
majority shareholders while at the same time accessing public capital
markets. Non-voting shares were also used to reward or motivate
employees through employee stock ownership plans. During this period,
by instilling a sense of ownership in public shareholders more generally
and employees in particular and by reminding these corporate stakeholders
of the value of family-controlled corporations, concerns surrounding the
impact of dual class shares on corporate performance and democratic
values were not raised by corporate stakeholders. This was due in large
part to the fact that there were only a few corporations employing a dual
class share structure in this period and such a structure merely appeared
to be a logical extension to the fact that historically and presently, the
37. Gillian MacKay "Splits to voting, non-voting shares unfair to minority" Globe and Mail (25
February 1980) B 1. The number of takeover bids in Canada had increased dramatically prior to the
introduction of the act. Victor P. Alboini, Ontario Securities Law (Toronto: Richard De Boo, 1980) at
626.
38. S.A. 1981, c. S-6.1, s. 132. See also David Stewart-Patterson "ASE ready for further growth in
better climate" Globe and Mail (21 September 1981) B31.
39. "ASE ready for further growth in better climate," ibid.
40. Securities Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. V-I, ss. 131-156.
41. "Splits to voting, non-voting shares unfair to minority," supra note 37. See also Ian Rodger
"Offer for Tele-Capital shares being opposed" Globe and Mail (21 August 1979).
Dual Class Shares in Canada
6wnership structure of Canadian corporations has been concentrated rather
than widely held. Situated in this context, the 1978 Royal Commission on
Corporate Concentration concluded that the use of non-voting and multiple
voting stock was not a danger to the investing public, "[i]f minority and
institutional shareholders have confidence in the management and in the
controlling interest and wish to acquire non-voting equity stock, they are
frequently able to so at a price substantially below that of voting stock. 42
A surprisingly limited voice on dual class share structures in the
Canadian context for the period from 1940 to 1990, was that of economists.
A review of general economics and corporate finance texts did not
surface specific discussion regarding dual classes of shares.43 Similarly,
a search of the indices of the Financial Post from 1975 to 1990 yielded
no commentary specific to dual class shares by economists. There exists
considerable literature, however, within the American context. 44 One
notable Canadian exception is economist Elizabeth Maynes, who in 1988
completed a doctoral thesis on restricted shares in Canada, 1970-1985.
Maynes identified various motivations for creating a class of restricted
shares: increased liquidity, achieving or maintaining Canadian control,
and the maintenance of the current distribution of voting rights.45 Maynes'
analysis of fifty-five share reorganizations during the period of study
concluded that shareholders' wealth was not increased by the reallocation
46
of voting rights. Looking to the period from 1980 to 1984, when the
OSC reviewed its policy with regard to dual class share structures, Maynes
concluded that the OSC's policy announcements affected the value of
shares. The threat to de-list inferior voting shares appears to have hurt the
inferior voting shares more than the superior shares, and the lack of clarity
regarding the OSC's intentions seems to have created confusion in the
market place.47
42. Report of the Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and
Services, 1978) at 291.
43. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Officer, ed., Canadian Economic Problems and Policies (Toronto:
McGraw-Hill, 1970); William C. Hood, Financing of Economic Activity in Canada (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1959).
44. See, e.g., W.H.S. Stevens, "Stockholders' Voting Rights and the Centralization ofVoting Control,"
(1926) 40 Quarterly J. of Econ. 353; William Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street (New York: Little,
Brown, and Co., 1927); W.H.S. Stevens, "Voting Rights of Capital Stock and Shareholders" (1938)
11 J. Bus. 311; Michael Jensen & William Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure" (1976) 3 J. Finan. Econ. 305; Marcia Millon Cornett &
Michael R. Vetsuypens, "Voting Rights and Shareholder Wealth: The Issuance of Limited Voting
Stock" (1989) 10 Managerial Dec. Econ. 175.
45. Elizabeth M. Maynes, An Analysis ofRestrictedShares in Canada, 1970-1984 (PhD Dissertation,
Queen's University, 1988) [unpublished] at 15-22.
46. Ibid. at 97.
47. Ibid. at 161.
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Economists in this period were more focused on the concentration
of corporate ownership in Canada. Randall Morck et al. indicate that at
the beginning of the twentieth century, large pyramidal corporate groups,
controlled by wealthy families or individuals, dominated Canada's corporate
sector. By mid-century, although the corporate sector encompassed widely
held firms, pyramidal family groups were on the rise after World War 11.48
In 1984, for example, nine families or individuals owned shares with a
market value of more than $9 billion, out of a total index of about $89
billion. 49 In 1990, fourteen per cent of companies listed on the TSE were
widely held, in comparison to sixty-three per cent of those listed on the
U.S. Fortune 500.50
After World War II, in an era of reconstruction and strong economic
growth, pyramidal family groups were on the rise. The Sobey and
Steinberg families built groups in land development and food retailing.
The Simard, Desmarais, and Basset families grew corporate groups in
Quebec, while the Irving, Billes, Thompson, and Bronfman families all
flourished in the war's aftermath.5" E.P. Taylor's Argus Group also grew
quickly, acquiring control of forestry and broadcasting firms. The late
1960s witnessed a "flurry" of control block acquisitions by both new and
old pyramidal groups.5 2 Several of these family groups implemented dual
class share structures during the 1950s and 1960s. Steinberg Inc. issued
non-voting shares in 1958; the Billes' Canadian Tire, in 1960; Argus Corp.,
in 1962; and Sobey's, in 1966. In many of these cases, demand for shares
far exceeded share issues. For example, when Steinberg issued Class A
non-voting shares demand far exceeded the share offering.
The quarter-century following World War II witnessed rapid economic
growth and expansion. Dual class equity represented a means by which
closely held or family-controlled corporations could participate in
expansion without relinquishing control. For example, Rolland Inc., a
paper manufacturing business, listed non-voting shares on the MSE in 1956,
and on the TSE in 1961; the issue of class A non-voting shares permitted
48. Randall Morck et al., "The Rise and Fall of the Widely Held Firm: A History of Corporate
Ownership in Canada" (July 2004), online: National Bureau of Economic Research <http://www.nber.
org/papers/w 10635>.
49. Dan Westell "Big chunk of business in hands of few" Globe and Mail (25 August 1984) B 1.
50. R. Daniels & P. Halpern, "Too close for comfort: The role of the closely held public corporation
in the Canadian economy and the implications for public policy" (1995-96) 26 Can. Bus. L.J. II at
12.
51. Morck et al. summarize the rise of these family groups, supra note 48 at 29. See also Michael
Bliss, Northern Enterprise Five Centuries of Canadian Business (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1987) at 465-469.
52. Morck et al., supra note 48.
53. "Investors Rush for Stock In New Steinberg's Issue" Financial Post (22 November 1958) 5.
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the company to raise equity to expand, while maintaining control in the
hands of the Rolland family. 4 United Auto Parts Ltd. (UAP), a wholesale
distributor of auto parts and accessories and founded by the Prefontaine
family in 1926, issued two classes of shares in 1966. Similarly, UAP
explained that its share structure allowed it to raise the capital necessary
to expand throughout Canada, while remaining a family-controlled
enterprise.5 Both Roland and UAP put forward these explanations only
in the 1980s, when the use of dual class shares was challenged, not at the
time that the non-voting shares were issued and faced no resistance.
56
By the 1960s, dual class share structures were increasingly used to
enable employees to participate in the growth of corporations, without
diluting the control position of the majority shareholders. This use for
non-voting shares was consistent with the growth of private pension
plans in this period. While organized labour played a role in the push
for pensions a record does not exist documenting involvement by unions
with regard to the use of non-voting shares in this period. Mid-century,
the debate centred around whether government or private business should
bear the responsibility for funding pensions. Employers had operated
various security schemes prior to 1950, and the Financial Post reported
an "enormous" growth in corporate pension plans from 1940 to 1950.7
Approximately one in five working Canadians had some protection against
old age, funded either through employers, insurance plans or federal old-
age pensions.5 ' The president of Simpsons Ltd., Edgar Burton, suggested
that businessmen could choose between a socialist welfare state or meeting
these new responsibilities themselves. He argued, "Welfare enterprise
should not be approached by businessmen grudgingly, or as charity with
no return. But it should be undertaken positively-the best investment
in the world."5 9 Increasing pressure to implement social security benefits
at this time can be attributed to several factors: the increasing difficulty,
particularly among lower-income groups, to save for retirement; the
growing proportion of older people in the population; the increase in life
expectancy; and the shifting nature of the work force from agrarian self-
60
employment to working for others.
54. Submission of Rolland Inc. to the OSC (1 September 1981) at 5.
55. Submission of UAP Inc. to the OSC (8 September 1981) at 5.
56. Ibid.
57. Ronald Williams "Unions Fighting to Get Into Driver's Seat" The Financial Post (24 December
1949) 1. According to a study quoted in the Post, from 1919 to 1937, 711 companies reported pension
benefit schemes, while from 1938 to 1947, 2,533 companies had adopted pension plans.
58. Ibid. at 12.
59. Ibid. at 1.
60. Ibid at 12.
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Organized labour led the push for pension benefits, targeting the
automobile, steel, and rubber industries in 1950. Unions argued that
pensions should be subject to union-management negotiations after the
United States Supreme Court had ruled to this effect. During the decade
from 1940 to 1950, the Financial Post reported that there had been a 250%
61increase in the number of Canadian workers in organized labour unions.
While targeting industry, the ultimate goal of the unions' campaign, the
Post reported, was a government-run social security scheme "from cradle
,62
to grave. Unions also hoped to raise the profile of organized labour
by successfully negotiating pension benefits for Canadian workers. The
Canadian Congress of Labour stated in a memorandum that "[s]ince
employers tend to introduce pension and health plans in order to stave
off union organization or to draw their employees' loyalty away from
the union to themselves, it becomes doubly' important that the role of
the union in elaborating, demanding and negotiating for these demands
be clearly established ... ,,6 Although at first supporting contributory
pensions, organized labour began to push for non-contributory pensions
with government or corporations bearing the full cost.64 In the U.S., Ford
had agreed to pay non-contributory pension benefits, spurring unions in
Canada to demand the same from employers.
The president of Simpsons Ltd., Edgar Burton, suggested that providing
for the long-term security of employees was part and parcel of emerging
economic values: "it seems clear to me that businessmen must decide very
soon whether they want a welfare state such as the Socialists advocate, and
which can lead only to dictatorial power in the hands of a few, or whether
,61businessmen large and small will meet these new responsibilities."
Dual class shares were used by corporations in this period to meet these
new responsibilities. Canadian Tire Corp. (Canadian Tire), for example,
implemented two classes of shares in 1960. John Billes had opened the
company's first retail store in Toronto in 1922, soon joined by his brother
A.J. Billes in ownership and management. In July of 1960, the common
shares of the company were split into two class A non-voting shares and
two voting shares. At the time of the stock split, A.J. Billes reported that
the class A shares would "permit employees to become partners in the
enterprise." He reasoned, "We think an employee's extra effort should
61. Ibid. at 1.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid at 12. Of 3589 industrial pension plans in 1947, 2895 were financed jointly by the employer
and employee, 604 were financed solely by employers, and eighteen solely by employees.
65. Ibid. at 1.
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be interpolated into long-range financial reward. '66 Toward this end,
Canadian Tire had commenced selling common shares to its employees
under a profit-sharing plan in 1958. By 1960, employees owned twelve
per cent of the company; after the stock split, the company offered class
A shares to its employees. One author has suggested that A.J. Billes's
insecurity regarding control led to the issuance of non-voting shares. 67
Similarly, other corporations issued non-voting shares as a means to
instill a sense of ownership in empl' yees, without relinquishing control.
Simpsons-Sears Limited, whose shae structure consisted of class A, B,
and C shares, adopted this share structure when Simpsons-Sears was
incorporated in 1952, to provide for equality of control of founding
shareholders Simpsons and Sears-Roebuck. The class A non-voting shares
were originally designed as shares which could be issued to employees,
allocated as part of profit-sharing plans. 61 In 1975, Magna Intemational Inc.
(Magna) introduced an employee profit-sharing plan to foster employee
participation in share ownership and profits. 69 Frank Stronach indicated
that the company kept its wages low to remain competitive, but "if the
company does well, we share it through our equity participation program.,
70
All employees were members of the plan, which invested exclusively in the
class A and class B shares of the company.7" On retirement, an employee
expected to receive the equivalent of the market value of the Magna shares
held for the employee by the plan.
7 2
In the quarter-century after World War II, dual class equity represented
a means by which closely held or family-controlled corporations could
participate in expansion and meet their new corporate responsibilities for
their employees in retirement without relinquishing control. This period
created the conditions for events that would transpire in the 1980s, when
the value of family control protected by dual class shares first began to
be cast in doubt by employees and shareholders. The issues surrounding
the private benefits of control associated with dual class shares would
take on additional significance because non-voting shares were issued as
66. "Split Stock, Up Dividend Fivefold" Globe and Mail (I July 1960) 19.
67. lan Brown, Freewheeling: The Feuds, Broods, and Outrageous Fortunes of the Billes Family
and Canada's Favourite Company (Toronto: Harper Collins, 1989) at 129.
68. Hudson's Bay Co. acquired the majority of class B shares from Simpsons in 1979. Submission
by R. Sharpe (on behalf of Simpsons-Sears Limited) to the OSC (31 August 1981) at 2.
69. Submission by J. Brian Colbum, Vice-President and General Counsel, Magna International, to
the OSC (13 April 1984) at 2 [Magna Submission].
70. Eric Evans "Small ends up big in Magna empire" Financial Post (22 October 1983) 17.
71. Magna Submission, supra note 69. Class A shares of Magna carried one vote each, while class
B shares carried 500 votes each. Stronach and members of management owned the majority of class
B shares: "Magna International Inc." (November 1984) TSE Review.
72. Magna Submission, supra note 69.
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a means to instill a sense of ownership among corporations' employees.
By the 1980s, employees, like other shareholders, would begin to think
of themselves as owners; the convergence of interests and concerns of
employees and other non-voting shareholders was highlighted in scenarios
like that of the Canadian Tire bid, that will be discussed. It was also just
before this period, in the 1970s, that the use of dual class shares began to
proliferate. It was at this juncture that nationalist policy, legislation, and
discourse took on a key legitimizing function.
3. Dual class shares and the impact offoreign investment review
measures
Beginning in the 1970s, while control remained a central reason for
corporations to utilize non-voting or subordinate voting shares, government
policy and legislative intervention directed at curtailing foreign investment
in the Canadian economy was increasingly used to justify the use of dual
classes of shares, as they began to face resistance by regulators, and later
shareholders and employees. This period of government intervention
relating to foreign investment began in the 1960s. Foreign investment had
increased steadily in Canada from 1900 to 1950. Although historically
foreign investment had been essential to Canada's economic development,
the character of foreign investment changed during the first half of the
twentieth century. The proportion of American investment in Canada
grew from 13.6 per cent in 1900, to 75.5 per cent in 1950, accompanied
by a decline in British investment. 73 A substantial amount of American
capital coming into Canada took the form of direct investment, and foreign
investment was concentrated in certain areas of the Canadian economy,
such as manufacturing, mining, and petroleum. 71
Foreign domination of Canadian industry and resources began to
receive increasing public attention by the 1960s.75 In 1956-57, Walter
Gordon, a businessman with strong ties to the Liberal Party, chaired
the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects. During the
course of the commission's hearings, Gordon noted that Canadians
expressed fear regarding the consequences of foreign control, equating
foreign domination of the economy with loss of political independence.76
The report's recommendations focused on ensuring increased access to
73. Michael Bliss, "Founding FIRA: The Historical Background" in James M. Spence & William P.
Rosenfeld, eds., Foreign Investment Review Law in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1984) 1 at 2.
74. Ibid.
75. Robert A. Donaldson, "Foreign Investment Review and Canadianization" in Corporate Law in
the 80s: Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada (Don Mills: De Boo, 1982) 461 at 472-
473.
76. Royal Commission on Canada s Economic Prospects, Final Report (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1957) at 390.
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Canadian jobs and research opportunities, greater corporate disclosure
by American-controlled firms, and increased Canadian participation in
the corporations' decision-making and shareholdings.77 Although the
Diefenbaker government did not act on Gordon's report, the report did
influence the public's perception regarding the impact of foreign investment
in Canada and injected the issue permanently into Canadian politics.78
The 1960s ushered in increased Canadian nationalism and anti-
Americanism, spurred in part by Canada's bi-centennial celebrations and
growing criticism of American involvement in the Vietnam War. In 1967,
Gordon, as a minister without portfolio in the Pearson cabinet, established
a special task force on the structure of Canadian industry, chaired by
Melville H. Watkins. Watkins, like Gordon, perceived American interests
as fundamentally antagonistic to Canadian interests.79 The report of the
task force, Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry,
outlined both the advantages and drawbacks of foreign investment in
Canada, ultimately recommending that more information be obtained
regarding the activities of multinational corporations, greater regulation
and taxation of such firms, and the establishment of an investment trust
called the Canadian Development Corporation to help limit foreign
takeovers.80
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, media publicity of American
takeovers of Canadian companies stimulated concern regarding foreign
investment, which translated into popular fears that the country was being
sold out to Americans. 81 These fears had increased, despite evidence that
Canada's dependence on foreign investment was actually beginning to
decline.82 Yet another study into foreign investment, led by Herb Gray and
entitled Foreign Direct Investment in Canada, was published in 1972.83
Gray characterized foreign investment as a complex mix of costs and
benefits; he advocated that any policies established to address the problem
should aim to reduce such costs and maximize benefits to Canadians. 84
77. Ibid. at 393.
78. Bliss, supra note 51 at 3-4.
79. Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond & John English, Canada Since 1945: Power Politics, and
Provincialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989) at 307.
80. Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry: Report of the Task Force on the
Structure of Canadian Industry (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968). See also Bothwell et al., ibid. at
308.
81. Bliss, supranote 51 at7.
82. Bliss, supra note 51. See also table, "US Direct Investment in Canadian Industry 1929-1977" in
Graham D. Taylor & Peter A. Baskerville, A Concise History of Business in Canada (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1994) at 452.
83. Foreign Direct Investment in Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972).
84. Ibid. at 7.
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The report's chief recommendation was the establishment of a review
agency to oversee and regulate foreign direct investment in Canada.
In response to Gray's report, the federal government passed the
Foreign Investment Review Act at the end of 1973.85 The Act provided for
the creation of the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) to advise
and assist in the administration of the Act. Under the Act, any acquisition
of control over a Canadian business by "non-eligible" persons86 was
subject to a review process. Similarly, direct foreign investment in new
enterprises and the expansion of an existing foreign business into new or
unrelated areas were also subject to screening. To receive government
approval to establish a new business or acquire a Canadian business,
foreign investors were required to file a notice with FIRA and demonstrate
that their proposed transactions were likely to be of significant benefit to
Canada, based on criteria set forth in section 2(2) of the Act.87 The criteria
were subjective, allowing the federal government to address proposals on
a case-by-case basis.
FIRA prompted firms to become "Canadian" to avoid scrutiny under
the Act, or boost their Canadian status: one method of accomplishing this
was through a stock reorganization that introduced dual class equity. The
Alberta firm Sulpetro Limited, for example, asserted that it introduced
its dual class share structure mainly to preserve its status as an eligible
corporation for the purposes ofFIRA, and to accommodate foreign investors
who wished to continue to invest in Sulpetro. 8 One lawyer advised that the
best way for foreign-controlled persons to become "Canadianized" (and
thereby avoiding the Act's provisions) was to convert their controlling
shares into some form of non-voting shares, allowing them full rights to
participate in dividends and upon winding up, while clearly demonstrating
to the agency that they no longer retained control over the corporation.89
In the same vein as FIRA, throughout the 1960s and early 1970s
governments passed various amendments to legislation aimed at regulating
"key sectors" of the Canadian economy, requiring a minimum level of
85. S.C. 1973-74, c. 46. The Act came into force in part on April 9, 1974. The remaining part of the
Act came into effect on October 15, 1975. For an overview of the Act, see James M. Spence, "The
Foreign Investment Review Act: An Overview" in James M. Spence & William P. Rosenfeld, eds.,
supra note 73, 13.
86. Non-eligible persons were defined by s. 3(1) of the Act and included foreign individuals, foreign
sovereigns and corporations controlled by such persons.
87. Spence, supra note 85.
88. Submission by Stanley Carscallen (counsel for Sulpetro Limited) to the OSC (31 August 1981)
at 4. See also Anthony McCallum "Main backers agree to Sulpetro plan" Globe and Mail (5 October
1981) B 1, which also states that Sulpetro limited voting rights in 1976 to create a Canadian-controlled
company in the eyes of FIRA.
89. Peter Hayden, "Go Canadian and Avoid FIRA" CA Magazine 108:2 (February 1976) 36 at 39.
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Canadian directors and Canadian ownership in corporations carrying
on business in these sectors. 90 Generally, the amendments required that
seventy-five per cent of directors be Canadian citizens ordinarily resident
in Canada, non-resident shareholdings be restricted to twenty-five per cent
of the outstanding voting shares, and in the case of a single non-resident
shareholder, holdings be restricted to ten per cent of the outstanding voting
shares. 91 Amendments to the Income Tax Act were made to help generate
a greater degree of Canadian ownership of voting shares by reducing
the amount of withholding tax for corporations with a greater degree of
Canadian control (at least twenty-five per cent).92 The Act also established
restrictions on the outward flow of investment, penalizing investment
portfolios that exceeded ten per cent of their value in foreign assets.93
Both broadcasting and energy were identified as key sectors of the
Canadian economy. Since the 1920s, Canadian broadcasting policy has
been connected with cultural sovereignty, national unity, and fear ofn v " . 94 . .
American control over Canadian broadcasting. Various royal commissions
examined Canada's broadcasting policy, but it was not until the 1950s that
the federal government introduced express limits on foreign ownership.
In 1956, the Department of Transport endorsed a proposal to limit foreign
investment to twenty per cent.95 The first formal restrictions on foreign
investment came with the passage of the 1958 Broadcasting Act, which
limited foreign ownership to twenty-five per cent of the voting shares of a
broadcasting undertaking.96 The 1968 Act gave the Governor General in
Council power to issue directives to the newly formed Canadian Radio-
Television Commission (CRTC) with respect to whom broadcasting
90. Donaldson, supra note 75 at 473.
91. Donaldson, supra note 75. See, for example, the Bank Act, S.C. 1966-67, c. 87, ss. 10(4), 18(3),
20(2) and ss. 52-56; Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act, S.C. 1957-58, c. 11, s. 3; Loan
Companies Act, S.C. 1964-65, c. 40, s. 38; Trust Companies Act, S.C. 1964-65, c. 40, s. 30; and
Investment Companies Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 33, ss. 10-15.
92. Income Tax Act, S.C. 1964-65, c. 13, s. 206. For an overview of legislative amendments aimed
at curtailing foreign ownership, see Foreign Investment Division, Office of Economics, Department
of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Selected Readings in Laws and Regulations Affecting Foreign
Investment in Canada (various years). See also Donaldson, supra note 75 at 551-565.
93. S.C., 1970-71-72, c. 63, s. 206. This was amended to provide for a 20 per cent limit in 1991: S.C.
1991,c. 49, s. 166.
94. In a 1932 address to Parliament, Prime Minister R.B. Bennett encapsulated Canadian broadcasting
policy with the following statement: "The enormous benefits of an adequate scheme of radio
broadcasting controlled and operated by Canadians are abundantly plain. Property employed radio
can be a most effective instrument in nation-building." As quoted in Monique LaFontaine, Foreign
Ownership, Television Broadcasting and Canadian Culture: an Appealfor Increased Liberalization of
the Foreign Ownership Restrictions (L.L.M. Thesis, York University, 1999) [unpublished] at 50.
95. Jeffrey Kowall, "Foreign Investment Restrictions in Canadian Television Broadcasting" (1992)
50 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 61 at 69.
96. Ibid. at 72-73.
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licences could be issued, based on Canadian ownership.97 The first CRTC
directive, which came into effect on September 20, 1968, limited the
issue of broadcasting licences to Canadian citizens or "eligible Canadian
corporations," whose chairperson and directors were Canadian citizens.
The directive required that eighty per cent of shares with full voting rights
and paid-up capital be beneficially owned by Canadians or Canadian
corporations.9"
In response to this regulatory intervention, several broadcasting
companies began to adopt dual class share structures in order to comply
with the foreign investment restrictions while at the same time enabling
them to raise equity capital. For example, Selkirk Communications Ltd.,
which became a publicly incorporated corporation in June 1959, listed
non-voting class A shares on the TSE in December of that year.99 The
company indicated that this share structure was designed to meet the
specific concerns of, and was adopted with the approval of, the Federal
Department of Transport and the Board of Broadcast Governors (as the
share reorganization was undertaken prior to the creation of the CRTC). °'
Citing the need to raise and access capital, the company concluded that
the capital structure of Selkirk "assure[d] it of compliance with the CRTC
Direction while at the same time it permit[ted] public ownership of its
securities."'1' CHUM Ltd. (CHUM) listed non-voting shares on the TSE
in December 1969. Similarly, CHUM's president Allan Waters indicated
that the company adopted class B non-voting shares in order to comply with
the CRTC directive and demonstrate Canadian control of its broadcasting
properties. 102
Numerous other broadcasting companies adopted dual class share
structures over the next two decades: Canadian Cablesystems Ltd., Baton
Broadcasting Inc., Astral Bellevue Pathe Ltd. and Shaw Communications
Inc. (then known as Capital Cable TV Ltd.), to name a few. 103 The Globe
97. S.C. 1967-68, c. 25, ss. 2(6), 7(1), 22(1) and 27(1). For an overview of Canadian broadcasting
policy, see Lafontaine, supra note 94, and Kowall, supra note 95.
98. Kowall, supra note 95 at 72.
99. Submission by F.T. Nash, Vice-President, Selkirk Communications Limited, to the OSC (27
August 1981) at 2.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid. at 3.
102. Submission by Allan Waters, President, CHUM Limited, to the OSC (15 December 1980).
103. In July 1977, the existing common shares of Canadian Cablesystems were reclassified as class A
common shares and new class B common shares were created. Baton Broadcasting, owned by the John
Bassett family, adopted a share structure consisting of class A non-voting and class B voting shares in
1981. Astral Bellevue Pathe Inc. effected a share reorganization at a meeting of its shareholders on
January 6, 1984, whereby its common shares were reclassified into (class B) subordinate voting and
(class A) non-voting shares. Capital Cable TV undertook a three-for-one split of its common shares on
January 12, 1982.
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and Mail reported that in December 1980, Canadian Cablesystems
delisted its class A voting shares from the U.S. market to encourage non-
Canadians to invest in non-voting class B shares and to ensure compliance
with Canadian law. 4 Acquired by Ted Rogers in 1979, the company
changed its name to Rogers Cablesystems in 1981 to "more accurately
reflect the continental nature of the company," a change that was prompted
by the company's marketing thrust in the United States and a fight for a
Minneapolis cable franchise.0 5 In 1980, Ted Rogers and his family owned
fifty-one per cent of the company's class A and 35 per cent of the class B
shares. 0 6 Similarly, Rogers claimed that the company instituted the share
structure to enhance its ability to raise equity capital while complying
with the CRTC directive. 07 As a result of this legislative intervention,
corporations with dual class share structures continue to be concentrated
in communications industries in the current context.
Energy, like broadcasting, was also singled out as a key sector of the
Canadian economy, precipitating regulatory intervention. Government
policy with respect to oil and gas exploration and development culminated
in the National Energy Program (NEP). Energy crises of the 1970s had
sparked policy intervention in the oil and gas industry: in 1973, an OPEC
oil embargo increased the price of oil fourfold, and in 1979-80, world oil
prices doubled.'08 After Joe Clark's short-lived Conservative government
was defeated, the new Liberal government under Pierre Trudeau announced
the NEP as part of its budget speech on October 28, 1980. The goals of the
program included security of supply, opportunity and fairness, to be attained
by achieving fifty per cent Canadian ownership of oil and gas production
by 1990, Canadian control of a significant number of oil and gas firms, and
an increase in the federal share of oil and gas revenues through made-in-
Canada prices and new taxes on producers. 09 The legislative foundation of
the plan consisted of Petroleum Incentive Payments Act and the Canadian
Ownership and Control Determination Act. °
104. Jane Davidson "Canadian Cablesystems delists class A shares from U.S. market" Globe and
Mail (7 January 1981) B5.
105. Ibid.
106. Submission by E.S. Rogers, Rogers Cablesystems Inc., to the OSC (13 April 1984).
107. Ibid.
108. For a short summary of the energy crises and government intervention, see G. Bruce Doern
& Monica Gattinger, Power Switch: Energy Regulatory Governance in the Twenty-First Century
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003) at 28-32. For a more detailed overview of government
policy spanning four decades, see The Canadian Energy Record 1945-1985: An Overview of Energy
Developments and Policy Decisions (Ottawa: Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, 1987).
109. G. Bruce Doem & Glen Toner, The Politics of Energy: The Development and Implementation of
the NEP (Toronto: Methuen, 1985) at 4-5.
110. S.C. 1980-81-82, c. 107, pt. 1, ss. 1-33; pt. II, ss. 34-62.
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The first Act introduced Petroleum Incentive Payments (PIPs) to
encourage exploration in "Canada Lands" off-shore and in Canada's
north; these payments covered up to eighty per cent of the costs of drilling
on Canada Lands. Entitlement to PIPs was based on two factors. First, the
Canadian Ownership Rate (COR) of participants was analyzed through
share or interest ownership (determined by owners' citizenship, residency
or immigration status in Canada); entitlement to PIP grants increased in
proportion to a firm's COR, providing that a basic participation rate of fifty
per cent was established.111 Second, the Canadian Ownership and Control
Determination Act adopted a Canadian control test: where an applicant
demonstrated Canadian control, it progressed to the COR calculation upon
which the PIP entitlement was determined on a sliding scale." 2 Only
those companies that were at least fifty per cent Canadian-owned would
be allowed to produce on Canadian lands. Full PIP grants were available
only to companies that were seventy-five per cent Canadian-owned,
while firms that operated inside a province or if they were not Canadian-
controlled received only limited grants."11 The NEP clearly attempted to
place foreign investors at a competitive disadvantage and incite the sale of
existing interests to Canadians. ' 14
As with FIRA, the NEP encouraged corporations to retain or enhance
Canadian control. The use of dual class share structures held value for
applicants who were otherwise non-eligible to achieve Canadian status." 5
The example of Dome Petroleum provides perhaps the highest profile
response to the NEP. Largely American-owned, Dome Petroleum created
a subsidiary in 1981, Dome Canada Ltd. (DCL), with fifty-two per cent
of its shares offered exclusively to Canadian investors." 6 Dome Canada's
shares were listed on the TSE in 1981, carrying restrictions "to enable
DCL to achieve and maintain a Canadian ownership level ... in order that
DCL may qualify for the maximum level of grants available under the
National Energy Program... .'117 Common shares could only be held by
individuals and others who had a Canadian ownership level of 100 per cent,
111. Robert G.S. Hull, "The Assessment of Canadian Control under the National Energy Program"
(1983) 8 Can. Bus. L.J. 19 at 19-21.
112. Ibid. The test for Canadian control relied heavily on the Foreign Investment Review Act, looking
to various indicia to determine if a participating group directed the applicant's course of activity.
113. For an historical overview of the NEP, see Bothwell et aL, supra note 79 at 451-455. See also
Doern & Toner, supra note 109.
114. Robert A. Donaldson, "Canadianization" in James M. Spence & William P. Rosenfeld, supra
note 73, 93 at 99.
115. Hull, supranote 111 at23.
116. Doem & Toner, supra note 109 at 228.
117. Prospectus (2 March 1981), TSE Submission, supra note 2, Appendix D at 15.
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determined in accordance with directive from the Petroleum Management
Agency to determine Canadian control." 8
For some oil and gas firms wishing to expand while still qualifying for
the most attractive PIP grants, dual class shares represented an important
financing tool. Southern-owned ATCO Ltd., which had diversified into
oil and gas exploration in the late 1970s, proposed a three-for-one split in
January 1981 of each A and B common share into two non-voting shares
and one voting share. The company indicated the reorganization was
"particularly important in light of the recent Canadian federal government
energy policy proposals, which place[d] a premium on Canadian ownership
and control." '119 The company's shareholders approved the reorganization;
the Globe andMail commented that the move allowed the Southern family
to retain fifty-two per cent control while raising equity capital, and also
could assist the company to convince Ottawa that it was "highly Canadian-
controlled and therefore eligible for the best breaks under the NEP."' 120
The share structure was "adopted to facilitate the raising of equity capital
through the sale of [non-voting] shares, while at the same time enabling
management to retain control and proceed with the corporate objective of
broadening the company scope to the benefit all shareholders."' 121
Both the NEP and FIRA were phased out with the newly elected
Conservative government in 1984; however, nationalist policy, legislation,
and discourse continued to be used to legitimate the use of dual class
shares. By the early 1980s, many Canadians had become critical of
FIRA, believing its operation had exacerbated the 1981-82 recession by
discouraging external investment. Oil and gas producers had suffered
when world oil prices dropped in the early 1980s. The anti-interventionist
Mulroney government replaced the Foreign Investment Review Act with
the Investment Canada Act in 1985.122 Under the Act, a new agency was
created called Investment Canada, and although having some regulatory
powers, the agency's main role was to attract new investment in Canada.
By the mid-1980s, then, the issue of foreign intervention in the Canadian
economy had lost some of its impetus:
11 8. Ibid. For further information regarding Dome Petroleum and Dome Canada, see Peter Foster,
Other People's Money: The Banks, the Government and Dome (Toronto: Collins, 1983) at 87-98.
119. Martin Mittelstaedt "ATCO to seek approval of shareholders for share split, reorganization
proposal" Globe and Mail (24 December 1980) B6.
120. Timothy Pritchard "NEP requirements may increase move toward non-voting issues" Globe and
Mail (26 January 1981) B9.
121. Submission by C.S. Richardson, ATCO Ltd., to the OSC (11 September 1981) at 2 [ATCO
Submission].
122. See Russell Deigan, Investing in Canada: The Pursuit and Regulation of Foreign Investment
(Scarborough: Thomson Professional Publishing Canada, 1991).
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Globalization offinancial, commercial, and industrial markets undermined
the regulatory and interventionist thrust of national governments that
had been fostered by depression and war earlier in the twentieth century.
While the National Energy Program marked the apogee of Canadian
government activism (except in wartime), it seemed in retrospect to be
a kind of last grasp than the logical culmination of half a century of
interventionism. 123
In the energy sector, foreign ownership restrictions in the oil and gas industry
ceased to provide a rationale for the use of dual class share structures. 124
However, dovetailing the use of nationalist policy to legitimate the use
of dual class shares was the economic recession of the early 1980s and
market demand for common shares following the recession.
In 1984, one lawyer surmised, "The market likes non-voting or
restricted voting shares. It gobbled them up. '"125 The reality is that the
market had little choice. Post-war growth had slowed by the 1970s and
by 1981, both inflation and interest rates had risen and Canada sank into
a full-blown recession. When the economy began to recover, the demand
for common shares soared. Pension funds, in particular, increased their
investments in common stocks during this time period. 126 The Financial
Times reported in March of 1983, "Institutional investors are hungry for
more common equity to put in their portfolios. At the same time, cash-
starved corporations are eager to provide them with new issues in common
stock.' 27 For corporations carrying high debt, the renewed investor demand
represented the first opportunity since the recession began in July 1-981 to
wind down their high levels of debt. 28 At the same time, "Many... issuers
took the preliminary step of creating new classes of restricted shares prior
to their public offerings and, as a result, the number and market value of
publicly-traded restricted shares rose dramatically." 29 After the recession,
then, many firms used dual class share structures to recover from depressed
markets and expand without losing control.
For example, ATCO's stock split in 1981 was undertaken not only
to retain control in the hands of the Southern family, but to counter the
123. Taylor & Baskerville, supra note 82 at 464.
124. By the end of 1984, approximately 20 companies in the oil and gas sector listed non-voting or
subordinate voting shares on the TSE: (December 1984) TSE Review.
125. Allan Robinson "Non-voting share fight heats up" Globe andMai (8 June 1984) B9.
126. Jacquie McNish "The rush for new equity" Financial Times of Canada (21 March 1983) 1.
127. Ibid. Laidlaw Transportation also provides an interesting example: in 1983, the company listed
new non-voting shares on the TSE not because the company required more equity capital, but because
the market was so strong.
128. Ibid. at 6.
129. OSC, "Position Paper Draft and Interim Policy on Restricted Shares and Request for Comments"
(2 March 1984) 7:9 O.S.C. Bull. [OSC Position Paper].
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massive debt the company had acquired in expansion. Analysts suggested
that any new financings would help the company reduce its high debt/
equity ratio and lay the groundwork for future expansion. 3' Similarly,
from 1981 to 1983, Norcen Energy Resources Limited (Norcen) completed
major acquisitions, which involved the purchase of $500 million in mineral
resource assets. The company anticipated a long-term trend of acquisitions
and an increased need for equity.131 It was with this future growth strategy
in mind, a company representative stated, that Norcen undertook a stock
split in 1983.132
Similarly, Magna reorganized its share structure in 1978 and created
subordinate voting shares. The automobile industry, however, was hard hit
in 1981-82. At the end of 1983, Magna issued additional class A subordinate
voting shares to reduce debt and increase equity for plant expansion. The
company's legal counsel asserted that the capital philosophy of Magna was
to ensure stability in times of high interest rates and depressed markets.13
Management, however, did not wish to relinquish control of the corporation
or increase its debt/equity ratio. Class A subordinate voting shares, he
claimed, were the catalyst that allowed for Magna's rapid growth: "Had
that growth required a shift of control through the issue of Class B [voting]
shares, it would never have taken place.' 34
Rogers Cablesystems had also accumulated massive debt while
embarking on major expansion in the early 1980s; Rogers's president
advocated the use of non-voting shares to expand while maintaining
control as demanded by broadcasting legislation. To accommodate
its plans, Rogers indicated that it would need to access equity markets
regularly due to the highly capital intensive nature of the cable industry. 135
"The use of non-voting securities," the company asserted, "represent[ed]
an ideal solution to the two somewhat conflicting objectives of raising
large amounts of capital while maintaining stability and control."'1 36
Within this regulatory and market context, there was a tremendous
rise in the number of companies listing dual classes of shares on the
TSE in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Seven new classes of non-voting,
subordinate voting or restricted voting shares were listed on the TSE in the
1940s, thirteen in the 1950s, and twelve in the 1960s. 137 In 1979, sixty-
130. Mittelstaedt, supra note 119.
131. Submission of William T. Kilboume, Vice-President, Legal and Secretary, to the OSC (13 April
1984) [Norcen Submission].
132. Ibid.
133. Magna Submission, supra note 69.
134. Ibid.
135. E.S. Rogers, supra note 106 at 5.
136. Ibid.
137. OSC Position Paper, supra note 129.
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four companies listed dual class shares on the TSE, while this number
had increased to 130 in 1983.138 The use of non-voting shares was clearly
expanding beyond helping Canadian corporations retain their Canadian
status. As we demonstrate in the next section, Canadian institutional
investors were increasingly purchasing non-voting shares, not the foreign
investors corporations employing the structure claimed non-voting shares
were for. It remained convenient to use the argument of protecting
Canadian business from foreign domination but the persistence of dual
class share structures clearly had other motivating rationales.
II. Responses to dual class shares
1. Invest with your feet to mandatory coat-tail provisions
Dual class shares are inconsistent with core Canadian corporate values such
as achieving top performance while limiting agency costs. In addition,
they are inconsistent with core Canadian values surrounding democracy.
With respect to corporate performance, a body of empirical data suggests
that in Canada dual class shares actually lower the market price of such
a company's shares because of an inherent bias in the market against
companies with these share structures. For example, one study reporting
on a comparison with American rivals, found that the profitability of
such Canadian corporations was significantly below their American rival
industries and other Canadian companies with conventional voting rights
for equity. 3 9 A different study reached a similar conclusion by considering
market values after an announcement of a dual class share issue, and found
that the wealth was less than before the announcement. 40 One reason for
this result is that dual class shares can turn off investors given that they
bear the full risk for the actions of management but have little or no voice
in corporate affairs. This narrows the pool of capital that such corporations
can attract when raising equity. The result is an increased cost of capital
for such corporations and a market for shares in such corporations that is
less liquid.
Not only are dual class shares inconsistent with values surrounding
corporate performance, they also bear a striking resemblance to the
undemocratic Canadian political environment predating suffrage. That is,
dual class shares have created a class of second-class corporate citizens
in Canada, such as pensioners, that bear full risk for the actions of
138. Ibid.
139. Paul Halpern & Ron Daniels, "The market and the closely held corporation in Canada: the
implications of concentrated share ownership for corporate performance" (1996) 9:1 Can. Inv. Rev. 49
[Halpern].
140. V. Dimitrov & P. Jain, "The Effect of Dual Class Recapitilization on Long-Run Stock
Performance" (2003) Working paper on file with the authors, obtained from SSRN Website.
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management but are given little or no voice in corporate affairs. The role
of democratic values in the corporate sphere has taken on an enhanced
significance with the growing recognition that Canadian corporations hold
an increased importance in dictating the ways that Canadian citizens lead
their daily lives, in contrast to other institutions such as the Crown and
Canadian government. ' 4' Accordingly, increased emphasis is being placed
on democraticizing all aspects of civil society.
Concerns surrounding democratic values can also be rooted in corporate
finance literature and can be framed in the context of a reformulated
version of the traditional Berle and Means agency problem. That is, for
corporations with dual class shares the central agency problem is that
of controlling shareholders taking advantage of minority shareholders,
rather than the traditional problem of professional managers who are
unaccountable to shareholders. In dual class share corporations, this
occurs because such shareholding structures violate the principle of one-
share, one-vote and accordingly corporate actions may be made without
the true support of the majority of shareholders. The lack of democracy
or the central agency problem remains unchecked because dual class
shares allow for management entrenchment. With unequal voting rights,
prospective purchasers and large investors effectively lose the chance to
present a purchase offer to the owners of publicly-held corporations: all
of the corporation's shareholders. Instead, prospective acquirers must
obtain the blessing of the controlling shareholders, no matter how tiny
the ownership position, before trying an acquisition. Similarly, dual class
shares inhibit competition for control, since voting strength is concentrated
in friendly hands.
The separation between economic ownership and control leads to the
entrenchment of an owner-management group. Further, such disparity
may invite controlling shareholders to engage in behaviour that negatively
impacts the unit value of the corporation's stock, but that provides direct
benefits to the controlling shareholders. The starkest example of such
activity is the tunnelling or transferring of assets among firms controlled
by the controlling shareholders so as to ensure that the assets are in the
firm where cash flows accrue mainly to the controlling shareholder. ,
2
141. J. Abbott & M. Achbar, "The Corporation," DVD (Canada: Big Picture Media Corporation,
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the diagnostic criteria of the World Health Organization to diagnose the modem day corporation as
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Specifically, it has been suggested that in comparison to corporations with
dual class shares, corporations with a single class of shares utilise more
restrained stock option plans, more reasonable executive compensation
and more transparent accounting. 143
When dual class shares were first introduced into the Canadian market
in the 1940s, because there were so few companies employing such a
structure and little opposition, they did not have to be justified. However,
it was in this period that arguments based on the benefits of flexibility,
long-term planning and targeted use of expertise could have justified their
existence to public shareholders. In the initial period, the idea that dual
class shares were in the interest of public shareholders and other corporate
stakeholders because managers could concentrate on what they knew best
- maximizing shareholder wealth by taking a long-term value approach -
and worry less about short-term performance, may have been accurate. At
that time, founders often did have a longer-term vision for the business than
investors who tended to focus on more immediate returns. Accordingly, in
that period both public and controlling shareholders could have benefited
from the dual class share mechanism. That is, by allowing growing
firms and firms owned by family entrepreneurs to raise financing without
diluting voting control of the company or increasing debt without having
a negative impact on shareholder wealth, dual class shares provided a way
of financing a growth company while allowing the founder to maintain
control.
While factors such as flexibility, long-term planning and targeted use of
expertise may have accurately represented the benefits of using dual class
shares when they were first introduced, recent Canadian academic studies
have challenged these benefits in the current context. In particular, two
studies have challenged the long-term planning or flexibility advantage of
dual class shares for family-controlled corporations. For example, Morck et
al. found in their 2000 study that Canadian family-controlled corporations
under-invest in research and development relative to their industry peer
firms of similar age and size.'" This result suggests a limited commitment
to long-term value or planning. Similarly, Paul Halpern and Ron Daniels
reported that firms belonging to one of Canada's family pyramids, the
Bronfman family, were more highly leveraged compared to comparable
firms. 45 One potential explanation for this result is that because investors
143. Ibid.
144. Ron Daniels & Ed lacobucci, "Some of the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Ownership
Concentration in Canada" in R. Morck, ed., ibid.
145. Halpern, supra note 139.
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are more reluctant to purchase inferior voting stock of such firms, firms
with dual class shares have to rely more heavily on debt-financing.
As more corporations turned to dual class financing in the 1980s, the
economic and democratic concerns surrounding dual class shares caught
the attention of securities regulators and other stakeholders. Nationalist
policies, legislation, and discourse were used to respond to regulators and
other corporate stakeholders who became concerned with the proliferation
of dual class shares. The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) adopted
a disclosure-oriented approach, failing to pursue the more interventionist
approach favored by shareholder activists. Quasi-regulators, such as
the TSE and self-regulatory bodies such as the Investment Dealers'
Association (IDA) also took positions on the use of dual class shares. The
TSE advocated mandatory coattail provisions for future issues, while the
IDA recommended full disclosure of the attributes of restricted shares.
Shareholders and issuers, too, expressed their opinions with regard to dual
class shares; the most vocal opponents included institutional investors,
exercising an increasing voice that accompanied their growing equity
participation in Canada's stock markets.
It was the TSE that prompted the review of dual class shares by releasing
a discussion paper on October 2, 1980. In its paper, the TSE requested
comments as to the appropriateness of restricting foreign ownership
through securities traded on the TSE, and if so, whether there was adequate
disclosure to prevent confusion among industry professionals and public
shareholders regarding non-voting, multiple voting or restricted shares.146
The discussion paper noted that in Ontario, the issues surrounding the use
of such shares had assumed greater significance with the revised take-over
provisions of the 1978 Securities Act.'47
In response to the TSE's discussion paper, the IDA spoke out against
any move by the stock exchange to limit non-voting or restricted shares,
suggesting that such a move would "fly in the face of government policy
supporting Canadian ownership and would also discourage equity capital
financing."' 48 The IDA pointed out that government policy dictated that the
national economic interest was advanced by greater Canadian ownership
in key industries such as banking, communications, and oil and gas. In
addition, the IDA noted that a number of companies faced restrictions on
foreign ownership to maintain their eligibility status under FIRA, while
146. Toronto Stock Exchange, "Discussion Paper re Listing of Non-voting Multiple Voting or
Restricted Voting Common Shares" (2 October 1981).
147. See part XIX of the Securities Act, supra note 40.
148. Dennis Slocum "IDA against restricting non-voting shares listing" Globe and Mail (14 February
1981) B2.
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other companies faced legal restrictions on ownership in their incorporation
documents (such as Nova Corp. of Calgary and the chartered banks). 149
The OSC responded to the debate in June 1981, by issuing interim
policies 3.58 and 3.59. Interim policy 3.58 pointed out that the securities
commissions of Ontario, Quebec, and Manitoba and the Superintendent
of Brokers of British Columbia were all concerned with recent public
offerings of equity securities which carried non-voting or restricted voting
rights (referred to by the policy as "uncommon equity securities"). 50 The
policy announced the OSC's intention to hold a public hearing in October
of that year; the Commission des Valeurs Mobilires du Quebec (CVMQ)
proposed a hearing around the same time, while the other provinces were
invited to join the OSC hearing. Policy 3.59 stated that until a decision
had been made following the hearing, no prospectus, statement of material
facts or rights offering with respect to a distribution of uncommon equity
securities would be accepted for filing by the commission. 5 ' The TSE
imposed a similar moratorium on the approval of listing applications
for such securities until after the OSC hearing. The Alberta Securities
Commission chose not to place any restrictions on the trading of non-
voting, subordinate voting or restricted voting shares, "sympathetic to the
needs of its particular clientele," oil and gas companies. 5 2 The president
of the exchange stated that a moratorium was "not in the best interests of
the companies where control is very important. We have no reason not to
list non-voting shares."' 53 He added that non-voting shares had been in
use for a long time and had not created any problems to his knowledge. 5 4
At the onset of the OSC hearing, OSC chairman Henry Knowles
reassured attendees, "You can disabuse yourself of the fear shares will be
delisted as a result of this hearing."' 55 The Financial Post reported that
submissions at the hearings came down hard on the side of "economic
realities and the need for flexibility in corporate financing."' 56 The article
pointed to some criticisms of the use of dual class shares, including those
of the president of Guardian Capital Group, who expressed the fear that
"management [was] reducing money at risk and taking out good salaries
149. Ibid.
150. OSC Policy 3.58, (26 June 1981) 1:23 O.S.C. Bull. at IE-9E. Uncommon securities were
defined as equity securities that were non-voting, did not carry the right to vote in all circumstances,
or with respect to which, as a class, the voting power was limited because of the issuance of securities
of another class carrying multiple voting rights.
151. OSC Interim Policy 3-59, (26 June 1981) 1:23 O.S.C. Bull. at 46E-48E.
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and perks. The low equity commitment of family controlled companies
... is clearly a negative sign."'1 7 Critics of dual class shares, however,
appeared few and far between. Nationalist concerns were used to justify
their existence. The vice president of Turbo Resources Ltd. argued,
for example, that nonvoting shares "enable[d] Canadian companies
to tap foreign capital markets without the risk of losing their Canadian
ownership status."' 58 Harris Steel Group's president stated, "I believe
most entrepreneurs would refuse to go public and not expand if there was
a risk of loss of control.... As controlling shareholder I am not prepared to
risk loss of control."' 59 The unique capital requirements of Canada and the
size of Canadian corporations compared with their American counterparts,
the Financial Post noted, were reasons put forth to justify the listing of
dual class shares. 60
At the hearings the TSE, backed by the IDA, asked securities regulators
to lift the moratorium on non-voting shares. 16' The TSE advocated
new disclosure requirements as well as amendments to Part XIX of the
Securities Act, so that the rules concerning takeover bids would apply
when a bid was made for non-voting shares. 161 With regard to take-over
bids and the possibility of non-voting shares being left out of a premium,
the TSE suggested that the exchange require the inclusion of protective
provisions in the attributes of newly listed shares, rather than amending
the Securities Act. 63 The TSE opposed a recommendation from the OSC
that some of the proposed regulatory changes and policy issues arising
from dual class equity be referred to a special committee of the Ontario
legislature.64
After analyzing the various submissions, the OSC published a new
Interim Policy 3.58 on November 20, 1981. The OSC determined that it was
not contrary to the public interest to permit the distribution of "restricted
shares," 165 provided that certain conditions as to initial and continuous
disclosure were met. The Quebec and British Columbia securities
157. Ibid.
158. Ibid.
159. Ibid.
160. Ibid.
161. Jack Willoughby "TSE pushes bid for share vote" Globe and Mail (1 October 1981) B8.
162. TSE Submission, supra note 2 at 21-23.
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regulators, as well as the TSE and MSE adopted similar policies. 66 In the
case of takeover bids, the Montreal Exchange "strongly urge[d]" issuers
to allow non-voting shares a special right to vote, rather than mandating
compliance, because the Quebec Securities Act, like Alberta's, did not
require that follow-up offers be made in the event of takeover bids for a
particular class of shares. 167 Similar to the OSC, the CVMQ met the issue
of non-voting shares with "lukewarm enthusiasm," but had been persuaded
that they held a place in corporate financing. 68
The OSC lifted its moratorium on listing restricted shares in January
of 1982, and the policy was fine-tuned in April of that year with the
assistance of the TSE. The effect of the policy was to give additional
power to the OSC and for the TSE to have the final determination in a
stock's classification. 1
69
Two years would pass before the OSC published its own position paper
on March 2, 1984. OSC chairman Peter Dey, who had been appointed since
the 1981 hearings, had advised late in 1983 that the OSC would intervene
when companies used non-voting shares in ways that obviously abused
the interests of common shareholders, but expressed faith in the ability of
financial communities to address concerns before any such intervention
might occur. 70 In its March position paper, the OSC pointed out that
since the 1981 hearings the use of restricted shares as a financing device
had increased' 7 ' and concerned investors had approached the commission
requesting that it take steps for their regulation. Although the OSC noted
that abolishing dual class shares could cause serious problems for the capital
markets, the commission aimed to take a more active role in regulating the
use of dual shares than the disclosure requirements laid out in the previous
interim policies. As such, the OSC suggested the "appropriate approach"
would entail "giv[ing] investors a stronger voice in the corporate action
required to create these shares and to prescribe certain minimum standards
for the terms of these shares to protect holders in the event of a take-over
bid for the issuer." 172
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The 1984 position paper recommended several additions to the interim
policy (now designated Policy 1.3). First, the OSC indicated that a receipt
would not be issued for any prospectus for a class of restricted shares
that did not include protective provisions to ensure that the holders of
such shares held the opportunity to participate in any take-over bid made
for the common shares, where an offer on the same terms and conditions
was not made simultaneously for the restricted shares (the take-over bid
protection requirement). Second, where an issuer proposed a fundamental
change in the capital structure that would have the effect of converting
common shares into restricted shares, the reorganization would require
the approval of a majority of the minority shareholders (the majority of
the minority requirement). Finally, where a voluntary offer for restricted
shares was made, the provisions of Part XIX of the Securities Act were
to be complied with (the voluntary take-over regulation requirement). 73
These amendments were made effective immediately on an interim
basis. The OSC concluded that the issuance of restricted shares without
protective orcoat-tail provisions was contrary to legislative policy.'74
The CVMQ immediately invoked the Ontario changes, while British
Columbia intended to follow Ontario after receiving industry feedback. 75
The Financial Post commented that the OSC policy held the markings of
Peter Dey's approach to securities regulation: a compromise drafted after
consultation. 176
The OSC received forty-six written submissions in response to the
discussion paper. On May 2, 1984, the Globe and Mail reported on the
various submissions that had been forwarded to the OSC, indicating
that both opponents and proponents of non-voting shares had criticized
the policy.'77 Several submissions suggested the OSC had exceeded its
authority, and that the decision to extend shareholder rights and to amend
the Securities Act should be subject to legislative approval. 78 Highly
outspoken was Edward Rogers, vice-chairperson of Rogers Cablesystems,
who alleged that the OSC was "imposing a form of censorship by denying
173. OSC Position Paper, supra note 129 at 3-4.
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investors the right to purchase non-voting shares," considering some
investors preferred higher dividends to the right to vote. 17 9 Lawyers
for ATCO Ltd. of Calgary expressed the view that "[i]f one accepts the
proposition that an entrepreneur should be permitted access to the equity
markets without being forced to lose control, then the issue of common
shares is not a viable alternative."' 80 On the other hand, the United Church
of Canada, whose equity investments totaled over $239,000,000 (including
the pension funds of its employees), noted that its fundamental concern
was shareholder democracy; for the church, non-voting shares violated
principles of stewardship that were fundamental to ownership. 8'
The Financial Post suggested that opposition to restricted and non-
voting shares was overblown: some believed that it was limited to a small
group of institutional money managers "who [had] been able to talk into
the right ears," OSC Chairman Peter Dey's, while others believed it was an
example of increasingly vocal institutional shareholders.'82
The commission held additional public hearings in June 1984 to address
the revisions to the interim policy. Discussion proved to be heated. The
issue had gained prominence in the media due to both outspoken critics and
proponents. 83 Rogers bluntly expressed his company's disdain for coattail
provisions: "We oppose coat-tail policies and will not implement them."' 84
Allan Waters, president of CHUM Ltd., also opposed the use of coat-tail
provisions and complained about the "garbled and distorted writing" of
the Globe and Mail ' coverage of the non-voting share issue. 85
Following the hearings, the OSC amended its policy, representing
a retreat from the disclosure-oriented approach the commission had
originally adopted. Interim Policy 1.3, as amended, deleted the take-over
bid protection requirement, while retaining the "majority of the minority"
and the voluntary take-over regulation requirements. 8 6 Peter Dey
summarized the OSC's change in approach: "What we're saying is invest
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with your feet. Walk away from what you don't like."'87 In response to the
concerns of issuers regarding the implementation of coat-tail provisions,
the commission decided that take-over protection to holders of restricted
shares was better left to the private sector.'88 Second, the OSC expressed
concern that any legislative provision would give increased credibility to
restricted shares in the marketplace.'89 The final form of Policy 1.3 was
published on December 21, 1984.'90 In general, the policy required that
(1) holders of restricted shares and prospective purchasers of restricted
shares be made aware that restricted shares had different rights than those
attached to an issuer's common shares, (2) holders of restricted shares
received those materials sent to holders of common shares, (3) holders
of restricted shares be provided with certain rights to attend and speak
at meetings of voting shareholders, and (4) shareholders held the right to
approve, by a majority of the minority vote, the creation and issuance of
restricted shares.' 9' Shares that carried a right to vote subject to some limit
or restriction on the number or percentage of shares owned by persons
or companies that were not Canadians were exempted from the policy. 92
Securities administrators of all other provinces and territories adopted the
new policy. 93
Although securities regulators declined to mandate coattail provisions,
the TSE stepped in to require them a few years after the OSC policy was
finalized in response to a bid for the Canadian Tire voting shares. Events
that transpired after the bid was announced demonstrate how the interests
of employees, as holders of non-voting shares, began to converge with
other shareholders. Both groups began to challenge the family control
and employee reward functions of non-voting shares. In November 1983,
Canadian Tire planned a five-for-one stock split (each voting share was
187. Arthur Johnson "Restricted share holders lose safeguard" Globe and Mail (12 October 1984)
BI.
188. Supra note 186 at 6. A number of issuers had indicated that although the interim policy was
not meant to be retroactive, the market might require the terms of outstanding shares to conform with
shares issued after the policy, which could in turn trigger appraisal rights in favour of the holders
of outstanding shares. An amendment to the Securities Act could address this problem, the OSC
statement noted, by requiring that any offeror bidding for the common shares of an issuer with a class
of restricted shares to make an identical bid to the holders of restricted shares. This scheme, however,
posed two problems: first, restricted shares often held preferential dividends and would necessitate a
determination by the OSC as to what would be a fair equivalent of the offeror for the common shares,
a process that could prove to be time-consuming and tie up the resources of both the commission and
the private sector.
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divided into four non-voting and one voting share) and a "better deal" for
holders of non-voting shares that included takeover protection, if a majority
of common shares were sold as a result of a general offer to all common
shareholders.'94 In addition, class A shareholders would be entitled to elect
three independent directors, and all restrictions on class A shares were to
be dropped. In devising this "package of sweeteners for the A shares," the
directors held discussions with senior staff of the OSC, who at the time
were reviewing OSC policy on restricted shares.'95 Shareholders approved
the stock split in December 1983. In response to the new class A shares'
attributes, Canadian Tire Chairman A.E. Barron observed, "In effect, this
corporation is changing from a family-controlled corporation to a public
corporation because of the change in directors."'' 96 Canadian Tire President
Dean Muncaster had advised in a letter to shareholders that the bylaw was
proposed "with a view to putting the holders of class A shares in a position
similar in effect to that of the minority holders of common shares in the
event of a change in control of the corporation pursuant to a takeover
bid."'197 Just prior to the stock split, the Billes children had acquired a 60
per cent control block of the company's voting shares. 98 The Billes's
planned to sell the non-voting shares made available through the stock
split to help pay back the $76.7 million in loans they incurred to acquire
their control block in 1983.
When the Billes children announced just three years later that
they intended to sell their control block, Canadian Tire employees and
shareholders were astounded. At the time of the stock reorganization
in 1983, few shareholders had contemplated a transfer in control of the
company. In December 1986, C.T.C. Dealer Holdings (Dealers) made a
bid to acquire control of Canadian Tire through an offer to purchase forty-
194. Paul Goldstein "Canadian Tire plans a split, better non-voting potential" Globe and Mail (23
November 1983) B2.
195. ]bid
196. "Holders let Canadian Tire split stock" Globe and Mail (16 December 1983) B4.
197. Karen Howlett "Canadian Tire probe to focus on fairness" Globe and Mail (18 December 1986)
BI at B2.
198. The Billes children acquired the control block in defence of a takeover bid by Imasco Ltd. In
1983, founder J.W. Billes's thirty per cent block of Canadian Tire stock came up for sale. Billes
had died in 1956; the thirty per cent block had been controlled by a voting trust up to 1983. The
beneficiaries of the Billes estate included twenty-three charities, who desired that the share block be
sold to provide them with more income; family members, on the other hand, opposed the sale. As
a result of a legal dispute over the timing of the sale, the Ontario Supreme Court ordered the sale
of control block in 1983. The family of A.J. Billes (the brother of J.W. Billes) controlled thirty per
cent block of the company at this time. Under a complex trust set up in 1962 to protect the family
control, the A.J. Billes family possessed first right to bid for the thirty per cent block. The children of
A.J. Billes (Alfred, David and Martha Billes) gained control of the voting block by bidding $73 per
share ($76.7 million). Imasco had attempted to take over Canadian Tire by bidding $75 per share, but
withdrew its bid after meeting with resistance from the Billes family and management.
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nine per cent of the voting shares; that October, brothers Alfred and David
Billes had announced that their combined forty-one per cent of the voting
stock was up for sale. Their sister Martha Billes owned another twenty
per cent of the voting shares, while Dealers owned 17.4 per cent, and
head office employees owned twelve per cent of through the company's
employee profit-sharing plan. 199 Non-voting shareholders owned ninety
per cent of Canadian Tire's equity. Dealers, according to the press, made
the offer to ensure the unique philosophies integral to Canadian Tire's
corporate culture be retained: "Hallmarks of the company's tight, family
approach [were] its tradition of sharing profits among all employees and
the network of independent Canadian Tire dealers."200
Because Dealers offered to take up only forty-nine per cent of the
voting shares, employees and other shareholders who held non-voting
shares stood to be left out of any premium: employees who just three years
prior thought they had been afforded protection in this precise scenario.
The Globe and Mail reported that through Canadian Tire's profit-sharing
plans, many of the company's non-voting shareholders were employees
who were opposing the Dealers bid: "Securities regulators and stock
exchanges have been bombarded by calls and mail from Canadian Tire's
non-voting shareholders, including the employees." 0' Many holders of
the company's non-voting shares vowed never again to buy non-voting
shares.20 2 The OSC intervened with a temporary cease-trade order and
held a hearing in December 1986, ultimately deciding that the proposed
sale was contrary to public interest. Dealers appealed unsuccessfully to
the Divisional Court of the Supreme Court of Ontario, and then to the
Ontario Court of Appeal, which denied leave to appeal in April 1987.203
The convergence of public shareholders' interests and employees'
interests following the Canadian Tire scandal that had erupted at the end of
1986 spurred the TSE to take action even in the face of nationalist rhetoric.
On July 30, 1987, the TSE issued a notice to its members proposing a
new policy on take-over protection for the holders of non-voting and
subordinate voting shares.20 4 The TSE mandated effective coat-tail
provisions as a prerequisite to listing any new restricted shares, promising
punitive action against anyone who structured a take over bid to avoid
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December 1986) A18.
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the intent of the policy. The TSE advised that the Montreal, Alberta and
Vancouver stock exchanges had adopted the same policy and agreed to
apply it uniformly.2"5
2. Shareholder activism: institutional investors 'opposition to dual class
shares
The rising prominence of institutional investors played a key role in the
debate in the 1980s regarding how dual class shares should be regulated.
The total equity holdings of Canadian banks, life insurance companies,
trusteed pension plans, trust and mortgage loan corporations, and
investment funds grew (in 1986 dollars) from $4.7 billion in 1969 to about
$85 billion in 1990.206 A growing voice in corporate governance issues
accompanied this increased equity participation.20 7  Many institutional
investors complained that they disliked non-voting or subordinate
voting shares, but had no other alternative but to invest in them due to
the relatively small size of the Canadian market and foreign investment
restrictions attached to investment portfolios.20 8
A group of institutional investors, with an 11.5 per cent stake in
Norcen (controlled by Conrad and Montagu Black), had opposed the
stock split of the company in November of 1983.209 Although the Globe
and Mail advised that shareholders had approved the stock split without
"serious challenge,"21 the Financial Post recounted a different story.
The motion required support from two-thirds of the shares represented
at the meeting, and obtained approval from seventy per cent of the shares
voted.211 Only 76.8 per cent of Norcen's common shares voted, however,
and the 34.5 per cent block controlled by Conrad and Montague Black
represented 45 per cent of the votes in favor of the proposal. In comparing
how minority shareholders voted, 23.2 per cent opposed the motion,
205. Ibid. See also Ralph H. Shay, "Five Years After the Canadian Tire Coattail Hearing A
Retrospective" (December 1991) 3:3 Corp. Gov. Rev. I at 17.
206. Jeffrey G. Macintosh, "Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in Canada" (1995-
96) 26 Can. Bus. L.J. 145 at 147.
207. For a discussion regarding the rising activism of institutional investors, see Jeffrey G. MacIntosh,
"The Role of Institutional and Retail Investors in Canadian Capital Markets" (1993) 31 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 371 at 380.
208. See, for example, Dennis Slocum "Some voting shares at premium over non-voting" Globe
and Mail (20 February 1984) B 1; "Non-voting share fight heats up" supra note 180; Brenda Daglish
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illiquidity of the Canadian market and the lack of available investment options may diminish the
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and 19.3 per cent voted in support of it. Most opposition to the proposal
came from institutional investors such as Canada Life Assurance Co., the
Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement Board, and the Caisse de ddp6t
et placement du Quebec. William Allen, vice-president of institutional
services at Housser & Co., suggested that there were legitimate reasons
for issuing non-voting shares (such as tapping into American equity), but
cautioned: "I rather suspect that there are far too many corporations using
this route as a means of increasing control of the corporation by the control
group without their having to put up any additional funds. '2 12 Indeed,
Conrad Black had faced intense opposition from minority shareholders
in September 1980 when he attempted to turn Norcen into the central
operating company of Black's group (Norcen, Labrador, and Hollinger-
Argus), 213 as the deal was to be approved only by Norcen's board without an
independent evaluation or shareholder vote. Faced with vocal opposition,
Black withdrew his plans for reorganization by November of that year;
it is likely this scenario was fresh in Black's mind when Norcen's stock
split was proposed in 1983. Both the Globe and Mail and Financial Post
indicated that it was unusual for institutional investors to be vocal about
their concerns, but greater numbers were reacting to corporate maneuvers
with which they disagreed." 4
Institutional investors also spearheaded opposition to the attempted
sale of the Billes family's control block of Canadian Tire's voting shares.
Soon after Dealers' announced the proposed acquisition, it became clear
that the offer had been structured to get around the coattail provision of
the class A shares. 215 Members of the investment community responded to
the proposed transaction with outrage. Stephen Jarislowsky, a vocal critic
of non-voting shares and manager of a pension fund that owned about six
percent of the class A shares, surmised, "The whole thing is extremely
unethical. '216 If the dealers succeeded in their bid, Jarislowsky made it
clear that legal action would ensue. 217 The Financial Times noted that
investors, analysts, brokerage houses, and even Canadian Tire employees
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September 1980) B2.
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were rallying behind the company's non-voting shareholders." 8 .A group
of institutional investors, led by Jarislowsky and William Allen, launched
a public fund-raising campaign to help fight the bid. 219 "This is a fight for
fairness," the campaign's newspaper advertisements asserted. 220
The Canadian Tire bid demonstrated that not all coattail provisions
would protect holders of non-voting shares where takeover bids were
made for common shares.2 21 One of the immediate effects of the failed
bid and OSC intervention was that companies with newly created dual
classes of shares tended to issue subordinate voting rather than non-
voting shares.222 Reaction to the bid also represented the growing voice
of institutional investors, who were no longer satisfied with justifications
based on nationalist concerns in situations where public shareholders'
rights were perceived to have been abused.
Conclusion
An analysis of the growth of dual class share structures in Canada over
the past six decades points to key themes: the concentration of ownership
of Canadian business, the roles of multiple regulators in securities and
corporate law, convergence between shareholders and other stakeholders'
interests, and rising shareholder activism. However, operating alongside
or in opposition to these themes, the theme that best accounts for the
proliferation and continued use of dual class shares is the reliance on
government policy, legislation, and discourse that addressed concerns
regarding foreign ownership and domination of Canadian business.
These concerns have been rooted in the reality of the composition of
the Canadian corporate economy; however, they have often masked the
inconsistency between the use dual class shares and core Canadian values.
This dichotomy continues to hold true in the current context; however,
institutional investors, whose interests have often converged with other
corporate stakeholders, have played a key role in exposing inconsistencies
between dual class shares and core Canadian values. Dual class shares
have also been taken on by the media, which has also played a central role
in highlighting these inconsistencies, particularly in the context of high
profile corporate governance scandals.
Early in 2004, the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance, a lobby
group representing institutional money managers (formed by Stephen
218. Caroline Meinbardis "Non-voting rights at stake in Tire bid" Financial Times of Canada (15
December 1986) 3.
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Jarislowsky and Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan CEO Claude Lamoureux),
advised large money managers to avoid investing in companies with
dual class share structures because of the potential for abuse of minority
shareholders.223 Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan investment guidelines
assert that dual class share provisions create a "second class" of common
shares, that allocate voting rights in a manner inconsistent with economic
ownership. 24 However, until 2005, institutional investors had little choice
but to invest in firms with dual class share structures due to foreign
ownership restrictions in their investment portfolios. Portfolio managers
that require liquidity were forced to own non-voting shares if the non-
voting stock is the more liquid class. 25
The ability of institutional investors to avoid non-voting or subordinate
voting shares has dramatically increased with the federal government's
recent elimination of the thirty per cent limit on foreign content restrictions
on RRSPs and pension funds. The announcement has led to speculation
that companies with dual class share structures will suffer, prompting more
companies with two classes of share to create a single class. Commentary
in the press has suggested that shareholders, including institutional
investors, now have the power to sell and find "worthier investments.
226
Companies with dual class shares have been sagging on the stock market
since the February 2005 announcement: "it's hard to ignore the fact that
pension funds are free to spend anywhere. They are no longer captives to
the Canadian market. ' 27 The lifting of foreign investment restrictions in
this sector may prove to be the tipping point that will significantly impact
the prevalence of dual class share structures in Canada and the use of
nationalist policies, legislation and discourse to legitimate this structure.
It will be fascinating to observe how pervasive this tool remains in the
current context, whether Canadian investors will exercise their options to
invest globally, and whether the market will in fact drive companies with
dual class structures to adopt one class of shares.
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